Protection of Application Service Hosting Platforms: An Operating System Perspective by Jiang, Xuxian & Xu, Dongyan
Purdue University 
Purdue e-Pubs 
Department of Computer Science Technical 
Reports Department of Computer Science 
2003 




Purdue University, dxu@cs.purdue.edu 
Report Number: 
03-010 
Jiang, Xuxian and Xu, Dongyan, "Protection of Application Service Hosting Platforms: An Operating 
System Perspective" (2003). Department of Computer Science Technical Reports. Paper 1559. 
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cstech/1559 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. 
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 
PROTECTION OF APPLICATION SERVICE HOSTING





West Lafayette, IN 47907
CSD TR #03·010
March 2003
Protection of Application Service Hosting Platforms:
an Operating System Perspective
(position paper)
Xuxian Jiang, Dongyan Xu
Department of Computer Sciences
Purdue University
West Lafayette, fN 47907, USA
{jiangx, dxu}@cs.purdue.edll
Abstract 1 Introduction
7711: Applicutioll Sen'ice Hosting Platform (ASHoPj,
as a realizatioll of tire utility computing visioll, "as rc-
eCII/I)' received (fell/elldo/ls ur/clITion from both il/dIlJ"ry
alld academia. All ASHoP provides a shared alld high
performance p/al[orllllO !lost multiple Application Services
(ASes). The ASes are oUl'>ourccd by Application Service
PrOl,iders (ASPs) 10 save their own IT resources. Flirther-
lIIore, ASHoP re.fOurces are al/ocllted to tile ASes in all 0/1-
demand!asIJion, so that resource supply always/allows tfw
time-varying service loud.
I" this paper, we argue 'hal rhe protection of ASHoPs
poses new challenges. Differem from a dedicated server
platfonll which is analogolfs to a pril'ate llOuse, an ASHoP
is like an apar/mellt buildillg, illvO!l'illg rhe 'host' - the
ASHoP inJrastTllctllre alld the 'tenams' - rhe liSes. As a
re.mfr, ll/l ASHoP has il/herelll reqllirelllellt of opelllless,
sharing, alld I1l11rua/ isolatioll: ir IIIUSt provide protecrion
alld isolation betweell the host alld rhe rellams, as well as
between differem tf/wms. Ullfortllllately, tradiriollal OS
archirectllre and ",edwlli~-msare lIot adelJ/lare to meer rhese
requirements.
We advocate /lew OS archirectllre and mechanisms Jor
ASHoP prorfcrioll, based O/l rhe virtual OS techllology. Ollr
experiellce SIlOII'S rhar I'irtual OS achieves berter protec-
tion of liSHoP infrastructllre, as well as beller isolario/l
betweell the ASes llOsred. FUr/hen/lOre, we preselltnovel
protectioll mechanisms we have implemenred: (J) resourcc
isolation bemreell ASes, (2) virtual networking and fire-
walling betlVeen ASes in a physical ASHoP server, and (3)
untamperable and privacy-conserving AS blackboxingfor
rhe foggillg ofactivities inside each AS. Allalogous to the
blackbox Oil all aircraft, rile software blackbox ill eadl AS is
untamperable; alld it COl/lil/lfeS to log el'en after rhis AS has
beell compromised. MoreOLler, for rhe pril'Gcy ofl1le AS, log
dara in tile AS blackbox are notl'iewable to tl/e 'landlord'
(namely ASHoP OWller) witT/om a/lrllOrizmion.
An Application Service Hosting Platform (ASHoP) is a
set of high perfonnance servers connected by high speed
LANs or swilches. The ASHoP creates a shared platform
for the hosting of multiple Application Services (ASes),
which are ollfsolfrced by their corresponding Application
Service Providers (ASPs). Examples of AS include on-
line event catering (such as a conference), on-line shopping,
and e-laboratories. In an ASHoP, ASes are created on-
demand althe requests of their ASPs, and ASHoP resources
are dynamically allocated to the ASes according to their
lime-varying service loads. Therefore, ASHoP reflects lhe
vision of IIrifif)' compl/rillg: compulational resources are
supplied on-demand, and turned off when no longer needed.
ASHoPs have recently drawn tremendous aUention from
bOlh industry (such <IS Oceano [5) of IBM and Utility Dala
Center [41 ofHP) and academia (such as Denali [31j, SHoP
[28), and SODA [19]).
However, current research in ASHoP mainly focuses
on resource and service quality issues. Linle efforts have
been devoled to the critical problem of OS architecture
and mechanisms for ASHoP securiry and protection. In
this paper, we show Ihal ASHoP proteclion poses new
research challenges. The new challenges arc due 10 an
ASHaP's inherent requiremenl of openness, sharillg and
II1I11/wl isolation. Unlike a dedicated serverplatfonn which
is analogous to a private house, an ASHoP is like an
apartment building, involving bOlh the 'host' - the ASHoP
infrastructure and the 'tenants' - the ASes. From a tenant's
point of view, lhe ASHoP should be a safe place to 'live'
wilh privacy and isolation from other tenants. From the
landlord's poilll of view, the tenants should not do any dam-
age to Ihe 'properly' and should not bother other lenanLS.
In this paper, we consider thc following requirements for
ASHoP protection:
• ASHoP illfmstTlfctllre safety The ASHoP servers
should be protected from malicious allacks from lhe
outside. If one ASHoP server is attacked, all ASes
residing in it will be affected.
• Conjineme11l ojASes The ASHoP should prevent any
damage by its tenants - the ASes. It is desirable that
the activities of each AS are strictly confined within
their allocated space in the ASHoP.
• lsolatioll be/ween ASes Il is equally important that the
ASHoP should provide isolation benveen the lenants:
Each AS should run as if it is in a dedicated envi-
ronment. Between ASes sharing the same ASHoP
server, isolation is desirable with respect to (1) admil/-
istration: an ASP should have administrator privilege,
but OIlly within its own AS; (2) jault and attack: a
cnlsh or security breach of one AS should not affect
other ASes; and (3) resources: each AS should be
guaranteed the 'slice' of ASHoP server allocated 10 it,
and it should not be able to launch a local DoS attack
upon other ASes.
• Secure comlllunicatioll between ASes Sometimes
neighbors do talk to each other: an AS may need to
communicate with another AS to form a composite
and value-added service chain. Therefore, the ASHoP
should enable secure inter-AS communication.
• Untamperable and privacy-co1lserving logging The
activities inside each AS should be logged for auditing
or forensic purpose. In each AS, the logging module
should be untamperable by an intruder and should
continue to log even after the AS is compromised.
On the other hand, the log data may contain sensitive
information, such as the customer information in an
on-line shopping service. The ASHoP should assure
that the log data are nor viewable by the landlord (i.e.
ASHoP owner), except during post-atlack forensic
analysis with authorization.
Unfortunately, the traditional sillgle-Ievel as architec-
ture, in which one underlying host OS supports all ASes
running on top of it, is not adequate to meet (he above
requirements (to be discussed in Section 2).
In this paper, we present a new fll'o-lf!l,er ASHoP archi-
tecture, based on the vinual OS technology. In the two-
level architecture, each AS runs on lap of a virtual guest
OS; while the guest as runs on top of the hosl OS. Our
experience shows that virtual as achieves better protection
of ASHoP infrastructure, as well as better isolation between
the ASes hosted.
Allhough the virtual as technology is not brand new
[8,13,31], we have designed and implemented a number of
novel mechanisms for ASHoP protection. Most notably, we
have implemented (1) reSOlfn:e isolarioll (CPU, bandwidth,
and memory) between ASes, (2) vin/lal lIetworking alld
firewallillg between ASes inside the same ASHoP server,
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and (3) IIIltamperable alld privacy-col/serving AS b/ackbox-
ing for the logging of activities inside each AS. Analogous
to the blackbox on an aircraft, Ihe software blackbox in each
AS is IUltamperab/e, and logs information even after this
AS has been compromised. Moreover. for the privacy of
the AS, log data in the AS blackbox are 1101 viewable to thc
landlord wilhoUl authorization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
2 compares the single-level and two-level ASHoP archi-
tectures. Section 3 presents an overview of our two-level
ASHoP architecture called SODA. Section 4 describes the
novel ASHoP protection mechanisms in SODA. Section 5
compares our work with related work. Finally, Section 6
concludes this paper and outlines future work.
2 Comparison of ASHoP Architectures
The two different ASHoP architectures arc shown in
Figure I: Figure I(a) shows the traditional single-level
ASHoP architecture; while Figure I(b) shows the two-level
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Figure 1. Two different ASHoP architectures
(only showing one ASHoP server)
In both architectures, multiple ASes are hosted in one
ASHoP server. In the single-level architecture, all ASes run
directly all top of the host as. In the two-level architecture,
each AS runs within a virtllal server, which is physically a
'slice' of the ASHoP server. Inside Ihe virtual server, the
AS soflware runs on lop ofa virtual guest as.
We argue that the traditional single-level architecture
is not adequate for ASHoP protection, in the following
aspects:
• Admillistratioll isolalioll: It is desirable that each
ASP has full administrator privilege only within the
corresponding AS, so that the ASP can perform AS·
specific management tasks such as data/software up-
grade. However, if lhe administrator privileges of all
ASPs are at Ihe same (host OS) level, access control
will become complicated and may lead to security
holes.
• lnstalfation isofa/ioll; Different ASes may require the
same library, but of different versions, or lheir service
daemons may require the same paTl binding. In the
single-level architecture, such conflicts are difficult to
resolve and can potentially lead to local DoS attacks
(by port exhaustion, for example) between ASes. On
Ihe other hand, Ihe two-level architecture naturally
eliminate such conflicts.
• Fault/allack i.mfa/ion; If all ASes run at the same
host as level, any fault or security breach in one AS
will- affect the host as and therefore other ASes. For
example, g/mpd [221 is a light-weight web server run
by the root. However, one known atlack upon gfltlpd
is: a malicious packet is sem as all J-fTI1' request,
causing buffer overflow 10 bind a shell all a certain
port. Then the allacker can remotely log in using Ihe
port, and run a remote shelll On the other hand, in the
two-level architecture, since the rootthm runs g/rltpd
is the TOOl of the guest as, not the host as, the attack
will IIor affect the host as as well as other ASes.
• Crash recovery and forel/sics; In the single-level
architecture, to recover from an attack/crash of an AS,
the entire ASHoP server wiJl have to be rebooted.
As a result, other ASes in thc same ASHoP server
will be affected. On the other hand, in the two-level
architecture, tile recovery of one AS has 110 impact
00 the oonnal operations of olher ASes: tile ASHoP
administrator can simply restart Ihe virtual server; and
the image of the allacked virtual server is dumped to a
file and sent to an off-line site for forensic analysis.
However, the advantages of the two-level ASHoP archi-
tecture do come with a cost. Due to the guest OSlhost as
structure, the performance slow-down is inevitable. 10 olher
words, to achieve the same performance or service quality
as in the single-level architecture, the two-level architecture
requires more CPU capacity. With the rapid advances in
high perfonnance server systems, such a price is expected
to be more affordable in the near future.
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3 SODA: Our 1Wo-Level ASHoP Architec·
lure
We are developing a two-level ASHoP arcnitecture
called SODA1• Currently, SODA suppons Linux as the
host OS of ASHoP servers. For Ihe guest as running in
each virtual server, we levcrage an open-source virtual as
project called UML [13], or User-Mode Linux. Unlike other
virtual machine techniqucs such as VMWare [3], a UML
runs directly in the unmodificd user space of the host as;
and processes wilhin a UML will be executed in Ihe virtual
server exactly lhe same way as tIley would be executed
in a native Linux machine. A special thread is created
to intercept the system calls made by all process threads
of the UML, and redirect them into the host as kernel.
The following features are cnabled by leveraging the 'UML
(guest OS)fLinux (host as)' structure:
• The host as has a separale kemel space from the
UMLs, thcrcfore preventing any hann done by the
individual UMLs.
• An IP address is assigned to each virtual scrver, so tnat
it can perform internetworking like a real servcr.
• A virtual server can bc frozen/restarted without af-
fecting other virtual servers: tne images of both lhe
UML and the AS on top of it can be copied to a filc,
and be conveniently backed up and restarted. Such
feature enables easy fault/attack recovery and forensic
analysis.
However, neither the original Linux (as host OS) nor
UML (as guest OS) is powerful enough to support ASHoP
security. We have extended both of them by implementing
a number of novel protection mechanisms, as described in
the next section.
4 ASHoP Protection Mechanisms in SODA
In this section, we present three ASHoP protection
mechanisms in SODA: resource isolation, vinual switching
lllldjirewalfil1g, and IIII/amperable alld pril'llcy-collserving
AS bfackho.l:illg (Ioggillg). All these mechanisms aim
at mccting the ASHoP protection requirements listed in
Section 1.
Although far from being a comp/ele suite of ASHoP se-
curity solutions, these mechanisms can be secn as the basis
for the implementation of more complicated mcchanisms
and policies.
lSODA st~nds for Scrvicc-On-Dl:mand Archite<:lUn:. Dct"ils about tnc
non-sccurity ;lSpccts of SODA can be found in [J9].
4.1 Resource Isolation between Virtual Servers
Resource isolation not only provides performance guar-
antee to the AS running in each virrual server, but also
prevents an ill-behaving or malicious AS from launching
local DoS attacks upon other ASes in the same ASHoP
server. Currently, our SODA implcmentation supports
CPU, network bandwidth, and memory isolation.
• CPU capacity isolation is achieved by implementing
a coarse-grain CPU proportional sharing scheduler in
the Linux host as. The scheduler enforces the CPU
share allocated to each virtual server. The CPU share
of a virtual server is decided when tlle corresponding
AS is admitted to the ASHoP. Within one vinual
server, all processes bear the same user (AS) id. The
host as CPU scheduler then enforces CPU propor-
tional sharing among all processes ba.,<;ed on their user
ids.
• Nenvork bandwidrh isolarion is similarly achieved by
implementing a traffic shaper inside thc Linux host as.
The traffic shaper enforces the outbound bandwidth
share allocated to each virtual server. Recall that
each virtual server bas ils own IP address. The traffic
shaper achieves bandwidth isolation betwecn virtual
servers based on the IP addresses of outgoing packets
generated by these vinual servers.
• Memory isolarion: Memory is critical to the perfor-
mance of virtual serve~ (and therefore thai of ASes).
SODA simply leverages the memory usage limir fea-
ture of UML: the maximum amount of memory avail-
able to a virtual server (both AS and guest OS) can be
specified as a paramcter when UML, the guest as, is
started.
NOle that resource isolation only prevents DoS attacks
beOl'een ASes. To prevent intra-AS DoS attacks launched
by the clients of an AS, other methods (such as diem
puzzles [6]) still need to be installed as part of the AS
software.
4.2 Virtual Switching and Firewalling
SODA uses vinual switching to connect the virtual
serve~ to the outside world as well as between themselves.
In rhe meantime, it creates a strong protection for the
ASHoP server: the ASHoP server itself will have 1/0 IP
address. Therefore, tlle host as is totally 'invisible' and
therefore un-allackable from tile outside.
To realize the seemingly conflicting goals of virtual
server networking and ASHoP server in-visibility, we im-
plement a software switch module inside the host as
(Figure 2). This solution is inspired by a real layer-two
switch connecting physical NICs, yet the switch itself does
4
not have an IP address. Similarly, we create a software
switch in the host as, connecting multiple virtual NICs
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Figure 2. Virtual switching and firewalling:
software switch inside the host as (Linux)
The software switch forwards packets to/from the virtual
servers. Furthermore, we enhance the software switch to
support firewalling and intrusion detection hetiVeenll,e vir-
Illal servers. The physical firewall and intrusion detection
system (IDS) can protect the ASHoP server from attacks
from o/ftside, but they can/lot handle attacks from one
virtual server against another virtual server inside tlle same
ASHoP server. Fortunately, our sofrware switch providcs
an ideal venue to perfonn inter-virtual-server fircwalling
and intrusion detection: the firewall and IDS modules arc
plugged in on the packet patll between the virtual servers.
Currently, the firewall and IDS code in SODA is based on
the widely adopted I/erjillerliprablesls/lorr suite. However,
the software switch can easily accommodate more com-
plicated firewalling rules (such as reverse firewalling) and
intrusion dctection methods (such as NATE [27J).
WiUl virtual switching and firewalling, the ASes can
communicate and collaborJ.te in a secure fashion. making
it possible to create composite and value-added application
scrvices. On the other hand, it is also possible to enforce
communication isolation via the virtual firewall - for ex-
ample, to prevent two competing ASes (selling Ule same
producL<;) from attacking each other.
4.3 AS Blackboxing
In ASHoP. the logging of AS activities is essential to
auditing and forensic analysis. However, we face the
following dilemma: If the guest OS performs logging, the
log may be tampered with or even erased by an intruder,
who tends to do so first thing after breaking in. On the
other hand, if the host as perfonns logging, two problems
will arise: (1) the privacy of the tenants (ASes) is violated,
because rhe landlord can view the AS log data and (2) it
is difficult or even impossible to log activities that happen
inside the virtual server.
In SODA, we use a novel strategy to solve the above
problem: the log data are ge/leraredby tlle guestas kernel:!,
but srored in the host as. The logging module inside the
guest as kernel, called AS blackbox, is capable of taking
snapshoL~ of AS execution, as well as collecting system-
wide (within the virtual server) log data such as those from
syslogd and kfogd, and verbatim record of user console
(local and remote) input. The log data are immediately
p/lshed dOlYl! to the host as for storage. Recall that the
host as is un-aUackable from both inside and outside, and
therefore an ideal place to store the log data.
Furthennore, to conserve the privacy of tlle ASes, the
AS blackbox will ellcrypT the log data before pushing them
down to the host as. For an AS, the key to encrypt the log
data is gelleraTed alld compiled into the UML kernel by a
trusted authority called the Trusted UMLFactory, before the
AS is created in the ASHoP server. As shown in Figure 3,
the Trusted UML Factory obtains the image of the AS from
the ASP, and huilds a customized UML kernel with the key.
The images of the AS and UML will then be downloaded
to thc ASHoP server. The key is nowhere to be obtained in
the ASHoP server. Iostco.d, it will be kept by the Trusted
UML Factory and by the ASP. In the event of a erash or
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Figure 3. AS blackboxing: AS blackbox 'man-
ufactured' by Trusted UML Factory; log data
generated and encrypted in guest as (UML)
kernel and stored in host as (Linux)
One of the main challenges in the AS blackbox im-
plementation is to 'hijack' the log infonnation originally
logged by s)'slogd, which in the danger of being killed by
!To make Ihe gucsl os kernel un·d=genblc by ils processes, we
lever.Jge Ihe 'skas' mode ofUML: the UML kernel is in a separ.Jle address
spolce from il prncessc.l. making Ihe UML kernel (olnlly invisible (0 ilS
processes.
5
an intruder. The challenge is the syslog library hijacking in
glibc library: glibc is so essential in the guest OS (UML)
thal once gJibc library is upgraded or replaced, both the AS
and the UML will be affected. Also the dynamic loader
(usually the file Ilib/ld-linux.so.2) should reflect the change
in gUbe, and be consistent with glibc at alltimes3. Finally,
for the development environment, the gcc compiler and
all related header files should reflect the new gfibe library
to ensure consistency. In our implementation, this major
UML rebuild is performed by ule Trusted UML Factory:
The Trusted UML Factory uses ule cross-compiler and
toolchain (currently targeting x86 platfonns) to generate
a much modified UML kernel (with the AS blackbox key
inside), and packages the AS into the eXI2 file system, which
will be mounted by the UML a~ the roOI file system.
5 Related Work
Internet hosting has been moving from content hosting to
application service (AS) hosting. The fonner involves the
hosling of digital contents (such as photos and audio/video
files) outsourced by a content provider. Examples of content
hosting platform include Yahoo! Phoros and Akamai [Ij.
On the other hand, AS hosting involves not just con-
tenL~, but also highly application-specific software (such as
genome matching and e-Commerce). Therefore. it requires
a higher degree of isolation between ASes in resource,
a.dministration, and faultlattack recovery. Examples of
ASHoP platform include Oceano [5j of ffiM and Utility
Data Cenler [41 ofHP.
Recently, virtual OS has received significant aUemion in
the as community. Represemative projects include Denali
[31J, UML [13], UMLinux. [12], SODA P9J, and Xen [8].
They all support the creation of virtual servers based on the
guest OSlhost as architeclUre. However, the protection and
security mechanisms in SODA have nol been reported in the
other projects.
It is noteworthy and interesting that the user-level mech-
anism for system call interposition in [I S] is very similar to
the way the UML [BI guest OS is implemented. They both
ex.ploit the plrace mechanism provided by a UNIX-style as
(including Linux) for the surveillance of other processes.
The purpose of [18] is intrusion detection and confinement,
also similar to that of the UML.
Server resource isolation has been extensivcly studied in
the traditional single-level as architecture [7, 23, 24, 26].
On the other hand, SODA is the jim virtual-aS-based
architecture thai implements resource isolation between
virtual servers.
The hOlleypof is "a computer system that is specifically
designed to capture all aClivity ... of a criminal who has
)We hml an experience in whieh we used Ihe newer version of
lIibflibc.so.6 wjlhou( updaling Ihe corresponding IIjbfld.linux,so.2. The
enljrl: UML becmne unusnble. since mOSI oomrrmnds depended on bolh
glibc nnd dyn1lllllc lander.
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6 Conclusions and Future Work
gained unauthorized access to the system" [IIJ. Recently,
virtual as (including UML) has also been applied to the
deployment of honeypot [2], in order to achieve better
attack confinement and log data capture. However. due
to its different purpose from SODA, UML-based honeypot
does 11O( support resource isolation and virtual firewalling
benveell honeypots. As to logging, UML-based honeypot
supports untamperable logging of attacker's keystrokes.
However. it is not able to caplure the log data originally
captured by syslogd. As discussed in Section 4.3. this
is a highly challenging task in our implementation of AS
blackboxing.
Another projecl that addresses unmmperable logging is
ReVin [14]. ReVin is based on the UMLinux [12J guest
as. One key weakness of ReVirt is that its logging module
is completely Oil/side the guest as. As a result, the Jog
data of ReVirt are much less detailed than those captured
by SODA's AS blackbox.
A paradigm similar to the ASHoP is the execution of
mobile code on a foreign host platform. It also involves a
two-way security relationship between the mobile code and
the host: we need protection of the latter against the former
[16, 29] and vice versa [16. 21). However. the ASHoP
paradigm is different in thai the host-tenant relationship in
an ASHoP usually lasts longer. and that the inter-tenant
relationship should also be considered.
Finally, our work in as support for ASHoP protection
complements the works in programming language support
for software safety [15, 17,25, 30J. The language-level
solutions are critical to the checking and enforcement of
safely propenies of the AS software, guest as, and host
as. in order to create a highly secure ASHoP.
We havc shown that the protection of Application Ser-
vice Hosting Platforms (ASHoPs) poses new research chal-
lenges. Due to ASHoP's inherent requirement of openness,
sharing, and mulual isolation, novel as architecture and
mechanisms are needed to provide prolection and isolation
between the host (ASHoP infrastructure) and the tenants
CASes), as well as between different tenants. We argue Utat
the traditional single-level ASHoP architeclure is nor ade-
quate for such protection, and that the two-level architecture
based on virtual as technology appears to be a promising
candidate.
The development of SODA, our two-level ASHoP ar-
chitecture. has so far been very encouraging. We have
successfully implcmentcd a numberof novel security mech-
anisms, which can be used as the basis for more complicated
mcchanisms and policies. Meanwhile. there are many
problern~ waiting to be solved in ASHoP protection and
security. Examples include: resource access authorization
[9. 32] in ASHoPs. privacy policy model [20J for ASHoP.
replay of attacks based on log data in AS blackboxes. and
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